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REVIEWS
The Review Section ofE&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited.
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed'
list should contact the Editor.

Steve F. Sapontzis, "Are Animals Moral Beings?", American�
American
Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1): 45-52 (Jan ua ry, 1980);�
1980);
"A Critique of Personhood", Ethics 91 (4): 607-618�
607-618
(July, 1981); "Must We Value Life to Have a Right to It?",�
It?",
Ethics & Animals 3 (1): 2-11 (March, 1982)�
1982)
Professor
Steve
Sapontzis
has
enriched the recent philosophical lit
erature with an original and carefully
reasoned defense of a very strong
an imal rights position.
He argues
that animals are capable of performing
vi rtuou s acts, that they merit a sort
of moral respect which should be
expressed in our extending to them
the rights to "life, to dignity and to a
fulfilling life", and that the common
tendency to regard all and only human
beings as constituting a morally sig
significant
class called
'persons'
is
wrong- headed.
The challenge pre
presented
to
ordinary-and
even
to
"enlightened"-views of. what is owing
to an imals is, obviously enough, quite
serious.
But Sapontzis' . challenge to stan
da rd moral reflection goes yet deeper.
"A Critique of Personhood" attacks an
entire constellation of ethical views
labeled
'humanist
egalitarianism',
within which a conceptually confused
and morally objectionable notion of
personhood is entrenched .He holds
that th is concept and its context block
further moral progress and proposes
that it be scrapped in favor of a

practice of moral assessment based on
individual merit,
rather than class
membership.
He begins
his
attack on the
received moral frame of reference by
noting that 'person' is a word with
distinct "metaphysical" and "moral"
uses. The former use ('personhood
d') is descriptive-it denotes a certain
class of things, on the basis of their
possession of a particular cluster of
traits. Sapontzis claims that this use
denotes all and only human beings.
The latter use ('personhood-e') is
evaluative-it indicates those whose
interests merit respect.
Persons-e
enjoy the right to life, to dignity,
and to fulfilling life; those who poss
ess such rights are to be contrasted
with nature and property.
The humanist egalitarian perspec
tive identifies these distinct uses of
'person'. Hence, it holds that all and
only human beings are such that they
enjoy the right to life, to dign ity and
to a fulfilling life. Sapontzis carefully
shows just why this is an error.· He
sorts out the ki nds of claims someone
might
be
making
in
identifying
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person-d with
person-e,
considers
arguments that could be brought in
defense of the various types of iden
tity claims, and concludes that they
all fail.
After observing that 'person-d' and
'person-e' are not intensionally equiv
alent (i.e., they are not synonomous,
as 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are
commonly taken to be), he goes on to
claim that the terms do not pick out
exactly the same set of objects-they
are not extensionally equivalent, as
are 'the Morning Star' and 'the Eve
ning Star'.
An assertion of exten
sional equivalence could be maintained
on three sorts of grounds:
if, as a
matter
of
fact,
language
users
employed them to refer to the same
set of things (which they don't, as
witness the linguistic behavior of sla
veholders) or if there were some log
ical or linguistic rule to that effect
(which there isn't, since any such
rule would violate the principle that
evaluations cannot be inferred from
descriptions), or if there were a suc
cessful "transcendental argument" with
that conclusion.
The burden of such an argument
would be that the assumption of
extensional equivalence is a necessary
condition for the very possibility of
morality; this might be the case if
rationality were a necessary condition
of a thing's being morally considera
ble.
But, as Sapontzis sees it, were
this true, 'rationality' could then not
mean 'ordinary human intelligence',
for what is necessary for moral status
is not intelligence of this sort, but
rather the possession
of vi rtues.
Rationality in the sense of human
intelligence cannot be a prerequisite
for such status, since non-humans
display such virtues as "love, self
sacrifice,
responsibility,
moderation
and parental concern" ("Critique", p.
614). Hence, no transcendental argu
ment trading on the idea of rationality
will
support
the
extensional
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equivalence of the two senses of 'per
son' .
Having sundered the two senses of
person',
Sapontzis
concl udes
by
rejecting the moral relevance of onto
logical status (except in the sense
that the possession of some trait may
be a necessa ry condition for the
development of some moral vi rtue) .
Thus, instead of engaging in the
fairly common practice of extending
the
reference class of
'person-e'
beyond "all and only human beings",
he suggests that such categorical
approaches to assigning moral status
be replaced by a criterion centered on
individual
merit.
"Moral
status",
Sapontzis writes, "is properly due,
ea rned and lost on the basis of moral
character, that is, on the possession
of moral virtues, and on that alone"
("Critique", p. 616) ..
That animals are indeed virtuous is
defended
in
"Are
Animals
Moral
Beings?".
'Moral
being' is there
defined as any being capable of acting
in a fashion that is morally worthy,
and wh ich merits moral rights-namely,
the familiar triad of life, dignity and
a fulfilling life. On a strictly behavi
orist view, animals often act in ways
that would unhesitatingly be described
as moral, i.e., as good or praisewor
thy.
But ou r hesitation to regard
animals as moral actors is not so much
a matter of whether thei r cou rageous,
selfless or compassionate acts are
morC!1 as acts. The major question is
whether they are moral in the sense
of indicating that animals are ethically
assessible as agents,
and
hence,
whether thei r actions deserve what
ever extra moral merit is attributable
to the good acts of moral agents.
There are two ready lines of rea
soning supporting· the contention that
animals are not moral beings in the
'agent' sense.
The first of these
takes reason to be a necessary condi
tion for recognizing that an act has
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moral value, and for engaging in the
act because it has moral value. Only
acts so understood and so motivated
. a re acts of moral agents. The second
line has it that rationality is a neces
sary condition for acting freely, and
that on Iy freely chosen acts can be
moral ·acts in that sense.
Sapontzis
rejects both arguments.
With respect
to the fi rst,
he notes that the
requirement that a moral act proceeds
. out of a recognition of its moral char
acter demands on ly that the agent
responds to the moral goods and evils
of a situtation. It cannot plausibly be
taken to demand that agents have the
understanding of meta-ethical issues
characteristic of moral ph i losophers.
Granted this, what remains to be
determined is whether animals ever do
recogn ize and respond to the moral
goods and evils of situations, or
whether their actions proceed simply
on the basis of instinct, or condition
ing.
Su rely, much a·nimal behavior can
not be understood on the model of
Pavlov's dogs,
or the compulsive
behavior of salmon swimmi ng upstream
to mate.
A nd we do seem ready to
rega rd certai n sorts of more complex,
more nuanced conditioned or instinc
tive behaviors as morally valuable.
Both maternal instincts and moral
habits, e.g., count as· responses to
moral goods and evils; both, says
Sapontzis, are directed to accomplish
ing a good, or alleviating an evil, and
hence meet the common sense criterion
for producing moral actions ("Moral
Beings", p. 49).
Further, some ani
mal actions-say, the cases of por
poises helping drowning sailors-must
be regarded as spontaneous acts of
k~ndness.
Porpoises have not been
conditioned to act so, and it seems
unlikely that they could be responding
to instinctual drives.
What rationality in the sense of
normal human intelligence does confer
on its possessor is the ability· to
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control and reconstruct both the world
and the possessor.
This is morally
significant, since, on Sapontzis' view,
a moral action is constituted as such
by its being a part of a moral enter
prise, part of the project of attaining
an ideal way of life. He writes:
Although many animals possess
sufficient reason, sensitivity,
or intelligence to
recognize
virtues and to do virtuous
deeds, they seem to lack the
ability to lead a dedicated
moral life...
While many of
their actions are virtuous, ani
mals are not moral beings,
because these actions are not
part of a moral life ("Moral
Be i n g s ", p. 50).
But, although animals cannot act
morally,
and th us a re not moral
beings, they ought still be regarded
as objects of moral respect.
Animals
can act virtuously.
In this respect,
they are similar to God, who is taken
always to act vi rtuously, but never to
be striving to act better, or to the
naturally well-disposed, who are vir
tuous spontaneously rather than as a
considered part of an idealistic enter
prise. But, according to our common
practice, such vi rtuous acts and vi r
tuous actors a re worthy of ou r moral
respect. Hence, animals who act vir
tuously also deserve such respect;
moral beings, in their quest to forge
a morally better world, should extend
. to them the rights to life, to dignity
and to a fulfilling life.
Sapontzis is concerned to minimize
the significance of one's understand
i ng of the moral cha racter of one's
acts, and of the freedom of one's
choice in electing a given act from
other
alternatives.
All
that
is
required is that one act with regard
to the goods and evils of the situ
ation.
This is altogether compatible
with
being unable to frame any
account of what makes something mor
ally good or evil, or of what moral
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value is; as Sapontzis points out,
ignorance of such matters is not lim
ited to non-humans.
The main posi
tive criterion he seems to insist on in
judging an act as a response to the
goods and evils of the situation is
that the agent is free of ulterior moti
vations.
But consider a machine
whose flexible and sophisticated pro
gramming allows it to respond to the
moral goods and evils of a situ
ation-say, a robot designed to recog
nize and respond to situations which
endanger children.
Surely, our life
saving robot will act on no ulterior
motives.
While there may well be a means
for marking of the
(presumably)
non-virtuous behavior of the robot
from the (putatively) vi rtuous behav
ior of the dog, when they vie with
each other over who will save a child
from the fi re, it is not immediately
clear how to do so on the basis of the
present account.
If we cannot do so,
we are left with either including our
robots
into the sphere of moral
respect, or drawing the distinction
between the virtuous and the non-vir
tuous nearer to the th reshold of
humanity.
It may well be that some
understanding of one's act as being
motivated by moral concerns is both
necessary for it to be fully virtuous,
and more characteristic of persons
than Sapontzis admits.
And should it be possible for ani
mals to be vi rtuous, does that not
indicate that they might be vicious as
well?
If so, the casuistry of our
relationship with animals becomes even
more complicated.
If ordinary moral
consciousness has tended to avoid
bestowing full moral laurels on the
dog who saves the child, so to has it
tended to exculpate the bear who
crushes a child.
Has this bear for
feited its right to life, dignity and a
fulfilling life?
Sapontzis may well be able to lay
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these worries to rest.
Showing the
moral insignificance .of the kind of
thing a being is may be harder.
Consider Sapontzis' use of the example
of God to indicate that a being may
not be a moral actor, but may yet be
vi rtuous, and hence deserving of the
rights to life, dignity and a fulfilling
life.
To say that God merits moral
respect because of His virtue has an
odd ring to it.
At best, it seems· a
very weak way of putting the point;
at worse, it confuses respect with
worship and adoration.
But even if
the kind of being God is does not
preclude respect, it does preclude
God's having any interests of the sort
which could possibly need protection
or acknowledgement in the form of
rights to life, dignity and a fulfilling
life.
This suggests that the kind of
being a virtuous actor is may be very
important in determining in what man
ner moral respect is appropriately
tendered to it.
It may further sug
gest a means of resurrecting the moral
utility of 'personhood', were it the
case that persons have interests which
other virtuous actors fail to have.
In his most recent article, "Must
We Value Life to Have a Right to It?",
Sapontzis takes up the suggestion that
persons may have interests which
demand a certain kind of moral pro
tection-say, a right to life-which ani
mals do not deserve.·
Ruth Cigman's "Death, Misfortune
and Species Inequality" (Philosophy &
Public Affairs 10 (1)) is Sapontzis'
target; her argument is seen as "well
on the way to becoming a classic
among opponents of animal rights"
("Must We Value Life.
.", p. 2).
Briefly, Cigman has it that em entity
could have a right to life only if its
death would be a misfortune to it, and
death can be a misfortune only to
those things which can value life
itself.
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This argument has been around for
a while; one can see it plainly in the
work of Michael Tooley (Cf. "Abortion
and I nfanticide" Philosophy & Public
Affairs 2 (1)). Tooley defines 'per
son' as "any being which has a right
to life", and attempts to determine
what is necessary to have a right,
and a fortiori, the right. to life. Like
Cigman, Tooley locates the answer in
. the interests of the individual in
question. I n particular, it is at least
a
necessary condition of having a
right to life, that one's interests be
harmed by losing life, and this, Too
ley claims, is only the. case for those
beings who possess a cognitive capac
ity sufficient to conceive of themselves
as continuing subjects of experience,
and to desire to remain so. This is a
trait which is not had by all human
bei ngs, and, as Tooley sees it, which
may well be had by some non-human
animals; hence, not all humans enjoy
the right to life, and not all animals
lack it.
Such an account avoids many of
the most perniCIOUS aspects of the
humanist egalitarian moral framework
Sapontzis criticizes in "A Critique of
Person hood. "
It does not identify
. persons will "all and only human
beings".
Neither does it imply that
the sphere of moral consideration
abruptly ends at the demarcation
between persons and non -persons.
For, although non-persons may not be
capable of the propositional attitudes
requisite for death to be a harm to
them, they may well have sufficient
consciousness to experience pai n, and
to wish to avoid it; that is, they may
be sentient and hence have an inter
est in remaining free of pain that
moral agents have a prima facie obli
gation to respect.
But if it is not in being humanisti
cally chauvinist that the Tooley-Cig
man style position offends, it may
offend in its egalitarianism-or so I
believe Sapontzis might argue,
in
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keeping with his attack on the stan
dard moral framework.
A central
moral notion for Tooley is harmful
ness.
In his earlier two articles,
Sapontzis seems uninterested in harm
fulness per se. His interest there is
in merit. No class of creatu res ought
to be accorded a certain set of
"rights" as its due simply in virtue of
its metaphysical properties; this is
mere prejudice.
So whether or not
death is properly seen as a harm to a
swarm of industrial and sociable bees,
as it would su rely seem to be to an
equal number of indolent, asocial.
human felons is not to the point in
determining what morality bids us do
in ou r quest for a better world, it
would seem.
What is owing to .the
members of a class is a matter of thei r
individual worth.
Hence, it would
appear to follow, in a "burning build
ing" situation, if you can save the
inhabitants of one room only, save the
bees. How can you consistently claim
to value industry over indolence and
cooperation over selfishness if you act
otherwise?
However, in "Must We Value Life to
Have a Right to It?", Sapontzis seems
to depart from his meritocratic moral
perspective, and to enter a more cus
tomary ethical arena, where the inter
ests of individuals-and hence the kind
of thing they are-become quite impor
tant.
Unlike Cigman, . he does not
hold that "taking an interest in life"·
is essential to death's being a misfor
tune to any individual, but he is will
ing to grant (at least for the purpose
of this article) that having a right to
x implies that lacking x is a misfor
tune, and hence that any being una
ble to experience the misfortune of
not-x could not properly be said to
have a right to x.
This would seem
to be the case even if the being in
question were an appropriate subject
of
moral
respect.
As
Sapontzis
writes:
The prejudice of speciesism
does not lie in denying animals
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the same set of rights enjoyed
by humans.
Animals have no
interest in equal educational or
vocationa I opportu n ities, so it
would be nonsensical to sug
gest that they shou Id sha re
human rights to them. ("Must
We Value.
. ", p. 8)
So it would seem, contrary to the
position expressed in "A Critique of
Personhood", that metaphysical prop
erties, and hence. class membership,
could be extremely relevant to moral
status. Sapontzis argues that Cigman
is incorrect in her view that death is
a misfortune only to those beings
which can value life itself; on his
view, it is not necessary to take an
interest in x in order to be harmed
by the loss of it.
It is sufficient to
have an interest in x in order to be
harmed by the loss of x. But surely,
different kinds of beings will have
different kinds of interest.
Sapontzis
supports
his
point
against· Cigman by noting that we
ascribe many kinds of right to humans
too you ng, too damaged or simply too
ignorant to be aware of what those
rights protect. To the response that
these putative counter-examples are
abnormal, and hence do not disprove
an analysis of rights predicated on
normal cases, Sapontzis offers another
counter-intuitive consequence of that
view.
I ndustrial pollution is a major
source of animal suffering, and since
animals are unable to understand the
relationships between pollution and
suffering, they must, on the view in
question, be incapable of valuing a
pollution free environment. But does
it further follow that animals are not
suffering
a
misfortune
in
losing
healthy habitats?
Sapontzis concludes that the inabil
ity to understand what is causing one
to suffer is morally unimportant where
avoidable
suffering
is
concerned.
Hence, beings may well have rights to
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things which ".
their kind are
standing and
Value . . . ", p.

. . normal bein.gs of
incapable of under
valuing" ("Must We
6).

Sapontzis' view that one need not
understand what is harming one to be
harmed by it seems correct.
But it
might be argued that the evil of death
is a special case; in order to be
harmed by death, one must possess
the kind of psychological concepts and
cognitive capacities of the sort that
Tooley and Cigman require. For how
else are we to understand how death
harms someone, if it is not by frus
trati ng desi res that they have?
As
Epicu rus noted long ago, death, if a
misfortune at all, is a curious kind of
misfortune.
It does not make anyone
worse off, or prevent anyone from
being better off, for there is simply
no one for these comparative notion to
be applied to (granted the assump
tion, uncontroversial in the case of
animals, that death is annihilation).
Sapontzis argues that our general
practice of judging death to be a mis
fortune to the person who dies rests
on the view that death eliminates any
possibility of future happiness for the
dead individual, not solely on the
notion that death frustrates certain
categorical ·desires.
Since this con
sideration applies equally to animals,
it would seem inconsistent to withhold
a similar judgment of misfortune in
their case.
However, the manner in which
death eliminates any possibility of
future happiness is logically odd,
since it does so without making the
pu rported su bject of th is misfortu ne
any worse off.
Death is not, after
all, like being permanently immobilized
in a sensory-deprivation chamber, still
existing, yet unable to enjoy anything
(to the best of our present knowl
edge). So, if we are to continue to
regard death as a misfortune for any
creature, we will have to resolve the
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problem that death removes the sub
subject of the harm.
If the harm of
death does not reside in the frustra
frustration of a desi re to live, it is difficu It
to see where it may be placed.
Another complicating factor is sug
suggested by Thomas Nagel's well-taken
observation that it is not merely the
quality of life that we value, but life
itself, and that (in general) the loss
of death cannot be reduced without
remainder into the permanent loss of
the possibility for further enjoyment.
(Cr.
Nagel's "Death", reprinted in
his
Mortal
Questions
(Cambridge,
1979).
Both these considerations-the
possible role of the frustration· of cat
categorical desires and the value placed
on life itself by those beings capable
of conceptualizing life itself-suggest
that there may· well be a morally
important distinction between persons
(not in the sense of "all and only
human beings") and other animals,
which may find defensible expression
in the extension of a right to life to
persons, but not to animals who fail
to be persons.
Another consideration raised by
Sapontzis' work in "Must We Value
Life to Have a Right to It?" mirrors
that suggested by "Are Animals Moral
Beings?":
it is hard to shake the
suspicion that Sapontzis may have
proved too much.
If it is not neces
necessary to take an interest in something
in order to have a right to it, we
cannot be sure on these grounds that
such moral reflexes as the restriction
of the right to suffrage to persons

have a respectable moral foundation.
Su rely, on Sapontzis' account, animals
have an interest in the results of
election and legislation; they may well
be subjected to otherwise avoidable
suffering, depending on the outcome
of many an election. Wou Id it not be
more in keeping with Sapontzis' over
overall program were he to suggest that
animals be extended
suffrage-exersuffrage-exer
cised, of course, through
human
prox ies. Perhaps such proxies wou id
have to satisfy some authority that
they understood and were acting on
behalf of animals' interests, insofar as
that could be determined, and wou.ld
exercise their proxy independently of
their own right to participate in the
electorial process.
Sapontzis' work has the great merit
of bringing to the readers' attention
how deep speciesism penetrates.
It
lies not only at the base of actions
and attitudes, but it affects reasoning
as well; the very inferences that we
draw are biased by species prejudice.
But our -reflexive dismissal of voting
rights for animals may indicate a sen
sensitivity to something of real impor
importance; the ethical significance of tak
taking an interest in x. Just as persons
(and presumably nothing else) place a
special value on the exercise of per
personal autonomy and upon their contri
contributions to the social organization that
binds them together, so do they place
special value on life itself. Such mat
matters
are involved
in
legitimately
according special status to reflexively
conscious
individuals, of whatever
species.

James A. Nelson
St. John's University, Minnesota

